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HECK, EXCESSIVE FORCE, AND THE FiFrH CIRCUIT
G. Todd Butler* and Nicholas F. Morisani**
I. INTRODUCTION
Every year, thousands of individuals with criminal convictions choose
42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a vehicle for bringing lawsuits against police officers.'
Their vehicle, however, often hits a bump in the road: Heck v. Humphrey.2
The rule from Heck is that claims for monetary damages calling into ques-
tion the lawfulness of a criminal conviction are not cognizable under
§ 1983.
In the large majority of cases, Heck's applicability is straightforward.
To take a simple example, assume an individual is arrested and convicted of
drug possession but subsequently files a § 1983 suit for false arrest. Such
an action plainly constitutes a collateral attack on the prior drug conviction
and is accordingly barred under Heck.4
But a more thorny issue arises if the allegation is excessive force. Al-
though the circuit courts of appeal are in agreement that excessive force
claims are not categorically forbidden, it is less clear how Heck applies in
different factual scenarios. While each of the circuit courts of appeal ana-
lyze the specific factual context in which the § 1983 claims of excessive
force are brought, the analysis from a majority of circuits demonstrates a
more limited application of Heck. The Fifth Circuit's analysis, however,
has led to a more expansive application of Heck. This difference in the
extent of Heck's application is the focus of this Article.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN HECK
Heck was issued during the Supreme Court's 1994 Term. The peti-
tioner was convicted for the voluntary manslaughter of his wife, and while
a criminal appeal was pending, he filed a § 1983 action alleging the police
and county prosecutors unlawfully destroyed evidence that was "exculpa-
tory in nature and could have proved [his] innocence."' Certiorari was
granted to the Seventh Circuit to decide "whether a state prisoner may
challenge the constitutionality of his conviction in a suit for damages under
42 U.S.C. § 1983."6
* Associate, Phelps Dunbar LLP, Jackson, Mississippi; Adjunct Professor, Mississippi College
School of Law.
** Associate, Adams and Reese LLP, Mobile, Alabama.
1. See generally Hon. Jon 0. Newman, Pro Se Prisoner Litigation: Looking for Needles in Hays-
tacks, 62 BROOK L. REv. 519 (1996).
2. 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
3. Id. at 487.
4. Id. at 484.
5. Id. at 478-79.
6. Id. at 478.
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In a splintered 5-4 ruling, the Court answered the question by fashion-
ing the now-famous "favorable termination" rule. Speaking through Jus-
tice Scalia, the Court wrote:
[I1n order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by
actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or
sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the con-
viction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, ex-
punged by executive order, declared invalid by a state
tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called
into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bear-
ing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not
been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983.'
The stated rationale underlying the favorable termination requirement
is avoidance of "the possibility of the claimant succeeding in the tort action
after having been convicted in the underlying criminal prosecution, in con-
travention of a strong judicial policy against the creation of two conflicting
resolutions arising out of the same or identical transaction." 8
Notably, Heck expressly barred not only claims for "unconstitutional
conviction or imprisonment" but also claims for "other harm caused by ac-
tions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid."'
An important question after Heck was whether excessive force claims fell
within the category of "other harms" the Court intended to preclude?
III. POST-HECK EXCESSIVE FORCE DECISIONS
Heck plainly does not apply in a certain category of excessive force
cases. For example, consider the case where an individual is caught red-
handed with drugs on his person, complies with orders of arresting officers,
and later is convicted of the possession offense. Just because the officers
lawfully arrested the individual does not mean the officers had the right to
use more force than necessary in executing the arrest. In order for Heck to
apply, a civil suit must call into question the lawfulness of the conviction.
In our example, nothing about a civil suit for damages would undermine
the validity of the conviction on the possession charge.
Other cases are not so simple. Consider the same example described
above, except this time, assume the drug possessor refused to comply with
the instructions of the arresting officers. If the events result in the individ-
ual being charged and convicted of resisting arrest, does Heck bar a suit
against the officers for excessive force?
7. Id. at 486 (emphasis in original).
8. Id. at 484.
9. Id. at 486 (emphasis added).
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One of the first post-Heck cases to consider the issue occurred in a
Mississippi federal district court.o In Simpson v. City of Pickens, the
§ 1983 plaintiff was arrested and convicted of public drunkenness, disor-
derly conduct, and resisting arrest." He later brought an excessive force
action, and the defendants sought to dismiss the claim under Heck.'2 Judge
Barbour rejected the request, explaining that the resisting arrest conviction
would "not necessarily bar a claim for use of excessive force under the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."' 3 In his view, it was possible for the
resisting arrest conviction "to coexist with a finding that the police used
excessive force to subdue him."' 4
The Third Circuit subsequently cited Judge Barbour's opinion with ap-
proval in Nelson v. Jashurek.1' There a pro se plaintiff alleged that, during
the course of his arrest, he disobeyed officers' orders to freeze and instead
ran away.' 6 After he was caught, he said the officers "beat him with a
flashlight and used excessive and malicious force to subdue him."" The
Third Circuit ruled that, even though the plaintiff's resisting arrest convic-
tion had not been overturned, Heck did not bar the claim:
[W]e believe that the Supreme Court intended to demon-
strate that a civil suit for an unreasonable seizure predicated
on a false arrest would be barred so long as a conviction for
resisting the same arrest remained unimpaired. But this
case is different because [plaintiff] does not charge that [the
officers] falsely arrested him. Instead, [plaintiff] charges
that [the officers] effectuated a lawful arrest in an unlawful
manner. Accordingly, . . . we do not see why a judgment in
his favor would throw the validity of his conviction into
doubt.'8
Similarly indicating a more limited application of Heck is a case from
the First Circuit." Thore v. Howe involved a defendant who pled guilty to
several charges, including assault and battery with a dangerous weapon on
three police officers.2 0 In subduing the defendant, one of the officers shot
the defendant in the neck.2 ' After pleading guilty to the assault charge, the
defendant brought a § 1983 action claiming he was not guilty of assault at
all and that the officer used excessive force in shooting him.22
10. Simpson v. City of Pickens, 887 F. Supp. 126 (S.D. Miss. 1995).
11. Id. at 128.
12. Id. at 129.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. 109 F.3d 142 (3d Cir. 1997).
16. Id. at 144.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 145-46.
19. Thore v. Howe, 466 F.3d 173 (1st Cir. 2006).
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While not determining whether the excessive force claim was Heck-
barred due to a lack of relevant facts in the record, the court made clear
that the excessive force claim was not automatically barred:
A § 1983 excessive force claim brought against a police of-
ficer that arises out of the officer's use of force during an
arrest does not necessarily call into question the validity of
an underlying state conviction and so is not barred by Heck.
See, e.g., VanGilder v. Baker, 435 F.3d 689, 692 (7th Cir.
2006).
Even the fact that defendant was convicted of assault on a
police officer does not, under Heck, as a matter of law nec-
essarily bar a § 1983 claim of excessive force. See Smithart
v. Towery, 79 F.3d 951, 952-53 (9th Cir.1996) . . . .23
Based on this interpretation of Heck, the court stated that the defen-
dant's claim that he was not guilty of assault was plainly barred by Heck.2 4
With regard to the excessive force claim, however, the court made clear
that a closer analysis of relevant facts was required before a determination
could be made as to whether the excessive force claim was so factually
related to the conviction as to be Heck-barred.2 5 Those facts were not con-
tained in the record, so the court passed on the relatedness determination
and eventually affirmed the district court's finding that the defendant was
judicially estopped from denying facts he admitted to in his plea colloquy.26
Demonstrating yet again a limited application of Heck is the Tenth
Circuit's decision in Martinez v. City of Albuquerque.27 There the § 1983
plaintiff attempted to flee from police after he solicited for prostitution an
undercover officer.2 8 The plaintiff briefly sped away from the scene but
later came to stop, locked his vehicle, rolled down his window, and placed
his hands on the steering wheel.2 9 When an officer reached into the win-
dow to unlock the vehicle, the plaintiff attempted to roll up the window but
was struck in the face by another officer.3 0 The plaintiff was then removed
from the car and placed under arrest.31 These events resulted in a convic-
tion of resisting arrest under New Mexico law, but the plaintiff later
brought a § 1983 action claiming the police used excessive force in making
the arrest.32
Finding the § 1983 claims predicated on excessive force were not
Heck-barred, the court first pointed out that the determination of whether
23. Id.
24. Id. at 180.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 185-87.
27. 184 F.3d 1123 (10th Cir. 1999).
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Heck applies requires courts to carefully compare the facts of the case with
Heck and to analyze the extent to which the § 1983 action challenges the
lawfulness of the conviction. So long as the § 1983 action did not require
a plaintiff convicted of resisting arrest to negate an element of that arrest's
lawfulness, a claim for excessive force would not be barred by Heck.34 To
that end, the statutory definition upon which the resisting arrest offense
was based had to be analyzed.
The portion of the New Mexico statute under which the plaintiff was
convicted defined resisting arrest as
intentionally fleeing, attempting to evade or evading an of-
ficer of this state when the person committing the act of
fleeing, attempting to evade or evasion has knowledge that
the officer is attempting to apprehend or arrest him;
resisting or abusing any . . . peace officer in the lawful dis-
charge of his duties.
The court pointed out that, under this definition, the question of
whether the plaintiff resisted arrest under these definitions was separate
and distinct from the question of whether the officers exercised excessive
force in effectuating the arrest.36 Consequently, the plaintiff was permitted
to pursue the excessive force claims, illustrating the importance of the stat-
utory definition of the offense for which the § 1983 plaintiff has previously
been convicted.
While Martinez and the cases discussed above find that resisting arrest
convictions do not bar § 1983 suits premised on claims of excessive force,
the analysis in those cases does not reveal the lengths to which courts will
sometimes go to find that Heck does not apply. A Ninth Circuit en banc
decision, though, provides a more revealing analysis." In Smith v. City of
Hemet, a plaintiff brought suit following his conviction under California
law "for willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing a peace officer in the
performance of his duties."39 It was held that Heck did not bar plaintiff's
claim under § 1983 that the arresting officers utilized excessive and unnec-
essary force.40
The en banc court placed particular significance on the fact that, al-
though the plaintiff pled guilty to resisting the officers, it was unable to
33. Id. at 1125.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1126.
36. Id. at 1126-27.
37. Id. at 1127.
38. 394 F.3d 689 (9th Cir. 2005).
39. Id. at 693.
40. Id.
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determine the factual basis underlying the plaintiff's plea. 4 1 The court the-
orized that it was possible that the officers could have used excessive force
either before plaintiff started resisting or after.4 2 Consequently, a damage
suit would not "necessarily imply or demonstrate that the plaintiff's earlier
conviction was invalid." 43 The Hemet majority thus demonstrates that even
a hypothetical factual scenario may be posited and accepted so as to nar-
row the application of the Heck-bar.
In dissent, Judge Silverman criticized the majority for "missing the for-
est for the trees."" He was of the opinion that the many different ways the
plaintiff might have violated the resistance statute was irrelevant. 45 For
him, because California law mandated that "a conviction for resisting arrest
establishes that the force used to effect the arrest was not excessive[,]" civil
recovery should have been impossible.4 6 The only way the claim should
have survived, in his view, was if the plaintiff had alleged the officers as-
saulted him after the arrest was effectuated.47
A recent case dealt with an excessive force plaintiff who did just that.4 8
In Evans v. Poskon, a plaintiff convicted of resisting arrest maintained that
he actually complied with officers' demands, yet was beaten both during
and after the effectuation of his arrest.49 In particular, a picture was
painted of police bursting in his home, tackling him, pinning him to the
floor, and then slamming his face in the ground.o He said that although he
was eventually handcuffed, officers continued to kick and hit him in the
ribs, face, and neck."' According to him, he never resisted during the
whole ordeal and even went so far as to yell, "Hey! I said I'm not
resisting! "52
In the district court, Judge David Hamilton, who now serves on the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, granted summary judgment to the of-
ficers. Hamilton noted that the plaintiff was "master of his ground" and
that his "allegations, sworn statements, and proposed expert testimony pre-
sent[ed] facts that [were] inconsistent with and necessarily imply the inva-
lidity of his criminal conviction for resisting law enforcement." In
essence, Hamilton considered the plaintiff's theory of the case as a whole
rather than looking to each and every detail alleged.
41. Id. at 698-99.
42. Id. at 699.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 707 (Silverman, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 710.
48. See Evans v. Poskon, 603 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010).
49. Id. at 363.
50. Evans v. Poskon, No. 1:07-cv-592-DFH-JMS, 2009 WL 2351741, slip op. at *3 (S.D. Ind. July
28, 2009), rev'd, 603 F.3d 362 (7th Cir. 2010).
51. Id. at *5.
52. Complaint at 10, Evans v. Poskon, No. 1:07-cv-592-DFH-JMS, 2007 WL 1550463 (S.D. Ind.
May 25, 2007).
53. Evans, 2009 WL 2351741, at *6.
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On appeal, that approach was rejected and the case reversed. Through
Judge Easterbrook, the court reduced the plaintiff's complaint to three sep-
arate allegations: "(1) that he did not resist being taken into custody; (2)
that the police used excessive force to effect custody; and (3) that the police
beat him severely even after reducing him to custody."S4 It was then ex-
plained that although proposition (1) was incompatible with the resisting
arrest conviction and thus barred under Heck, "propositions (2) and (3) are
entirely consistent with a conviction for resisting arrest."5 5 Ruling that
those aspects of the suit could proceed, Judge Easterbrook noted that the
plaintiff did not assert propositions (2) and (3) in such a way as to make
those propositions contingent upon the court's acceptance of proposition
(1).56 It was further noted that the plaintiff was not required to adopt the
defendant's version of the facts leading to the resisting arrest conviction in
order to contest the degree of force used by the defendants, and thus the
plaintiff was allowed to proceed with propositions (2) and (3).57
The primary difference between the district and circuit court opinions
in Evans stems from the respective courts' treatments of the plaintiff's
complaint. The circuit court closely analyzed the plaintiff's complaint;
gleaned three separate propositions from the complaint; and found that,
though the first proposition was Heck-barred, the remaining two proposi-
tions were not. By contrast, the district court took a broader view of the
complaint, emphasized the connection between the facts relied upon by the
plaintiff and the facts supporting the resisting arrest conviction, and liber-
ally applied Heck to find that this factual connection compelled the failure
of the plaintiff's excessive force claim.
Taking Poskon and the other cases discussed above together, it is ap-
parent that in the majority of circuits it is not overly difficult for plaintiffs
to get past summary judgment on a § 1983 claim for excessive force, despite
a resisting arrest conviction. These circuits generally apply the same analy-
sis to narrow the application of Heck; namely, they take the conviction and
the excessive force claim and closely analyze the facts to determine
whether there is any way the excessive force claim can survive. This com-
mon approach is particularly evident in Hemet and Poskon. Interestingly
enough, the expansive versus narrow application of Heck found in the dis-
trict and circuit court opinions in Poskon serves as a microcosm of the dif-
ferences in the application of Heck between the majority of United States
circuit courts and the Fifth Circuit.
IV. FIFrH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
Two notable post-Heck decisions in the Fifth Circuit involved underly-
ing aggravated assault convictions under Texas law, not resisting arrest con-
victions. In Texas, a conviction for aggravated assault requires proof that
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the perpetrator caused "serious bodily injury."" Texas law also provides
that any person can use force up to and including deadly force "to protect
himself against the other's use or attempted use of unlawful deadly
force." 5 9 In both Sappington v. Bartee and Hainze v. Richards,6 0 the court
reasoned that the defendant-officers were justified in using force up to and
including deadly force to resist the assault and effect the arrest.61 Accord-
ingly, it was held that any amount of force utilized could not have been
excessive, and thus Heck barred the plaintiffs' claims as a matter of law.6 2
Similar reasoning was employed by a three-judge panel in Hudson v.
Hughes.63 There, a § 1983 plaintiff who had been convicted under Louisi-
ana law for battery on an officer alleged "he was brutally beaten during his
arrest, that excessive force was used, and that these acts were unconstitu-
tional."' It was held that Heck barred his excessive force claim because it
called the validity of his conviction into question:
Hudson was arrested and convicted of battery of an officer.
In Louisiana, self-defense is a justification defense to the
crime of battery of an officer. To make out a justification
defense, the criminal defendant charged with battery of an
officer must show that his use of force against an officer was
both reasonable and necessary to prevent a forcible offense
against himself. Because self-defense is a justification de-
fense to the crime of battery of an officer, Hudson's claim
that [defendants] used excessive force while apprehending
him, if proved, necessarily would imply the invalidity of his
arrest and conviction for battery of an officer. This is true
because the question whether the police applied reasonable
force in arresting him depends in part on the degree of his
resistance, which in turn will place in issue whether his resis-
tance (the basis of his conviction for assaulting a police of-
ficer) was justified, which, if it were, necessarily undermines
that conviction. We conclude therefore that to the extent
that Hudson seeks to recover from [defendants] for the de-
fendants' alleged use of excessive force during his arrest, his
section 1983 action may not proceed.65
Sappington, Hainze, and Hudson underscore that, in the Fifth Circuit,
Heck's applicability often turns both on the state law charge and any perti-
nent defense to that charge. In Sappington and Hainze, the focal point was
58. Sappington v. Bartee, 195 F.3d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1999).
59. Id.
60. 207 F.3d 795 (5th Cir. 2000).
61. Id. at 800-01; Sappington, 195 F.3d at 237.
62. Hainze, 207 F.3d at 798; Sappington, 195 F.3d at 237.
63. 98 F.3d 868 (5th Cir.1996).
64. Id. at 871.
65. Id. at 873.
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on whether the officers were justified in using force because of the plain-
tiff's resistance. Hudson, alternatively, featured analysis centering on
whether the plaintiff's resistance was an appropriate response to the of-
ficers' alleged exertion of force.
Building on the cases already discussed, the Fifth Circuit carved out
another factual context for Heck in Arnold v. Town of Slaughter.6 6 Arnold
was an unpublished decision in which the plaintiff had been convicted
under Louisiana law for resisting arrest.6 7 The Louisiana statute provides
that "[r]esisting an officer is the intentional interference with, opposition or
resistance to, or obstruction of an individual acting in his official capacity
and authorized by law to make a lawful arrest . ."68 The court acknowl-
edged that the factual basis for the state court conviction was that the
plaintiff had resisted "by being hostile and threatening and by initiating
confrontation." 69
Of particular importance was the plaintiff's theory of the case. In his
complaint, the plaintiff alleged that, while walking in his home, police of-
ficers slammed his head into the ground and broke his neck by placing him
in a chokehold.7 0 At his deposition, the plaintiff "testified that he never
attempted to strike any of the officers, never threatened any of them[,] and,
in fact, never resisted their attempts to arrest him."" The Court summa-
rized the plaintiff's position as follows: "Arnold's claims are not that the
police used excessive force after he stopped resisting arrest or even that the
officers used excessive and unreasonable force to stop his resistance. In-
stead, Arnold claims that he did nothing wrong, but was viciously attacked
for no reason."72
Ultimately, the court applied Heck after concluding that the plaintiff's
§ 1983 suit "squarely challenge[d] the factual determination that underlies
his conviction for resisting an officer[,]" and it thus would effectively estab-
lish that the "criminal conviction lacks any basis."7 3 To date, Arnold has
been cited twenty-seven times in other opinions. It also is noteworthy that
Arnold's reasoning was quoted with approval in the Fifth Circuit's pub-
lished opinion in DeLeon v. City of Corpus Christi.7 4
V. CONCLUSION
Plainly, there is little consistency among the circuits with respect to
Heck's applicability in excessive force cases. Most circuits seem to give
§ 1983 plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt, dismissing excessive force claims
only if they can theorize no set of facts on which the plaintiff could make
66. 100 F. App'x 321, 324-25 (5th Cir. 2004).
67. Id. at 322.
68. Id. at 323.




73. Id. at 325.
74. 488 F.3d 649 (5th Cir. 2007).
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out a claim for relief. Their focus is on Heck's language that the subse-
quent civil suit must "necessarily undermine the validity of the prior con-
viction." Alternatively, the Fifth Circuit seems to read the word necessarily
differently. The court refuses to dream up all possible scenarios in which
the plaintiff could sustain a claim; instead, the plaintiff is held to his or her
word, with the court looking at what is alleged in the complaint and at what
has been testified to in depositions. Until the Supreme Court intervenes
and takes up an excessive force case where there is an outstanding resisting
arrest conviction, the difference in opinion will remain unresolved.
